The French Political Permacrisis: The Dawn of a Fresh Governmental Reality
Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he became the fifth British prime minister to take up the position over a six-year span.
Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – with three in the past 10 months?
The latest prime minister, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his administration's continuation.
But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.
Minority Rule
Key background: from the moment Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament separated into three opposing factions – the left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.
Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.
In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.
In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.
To such an extent that the following day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.
A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for another 48 hours in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it mildly, not without complications.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.
Macron honored his word – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.
With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, due on Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”
Changing Political Culture
The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.
A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.
To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, like his predecessors, finished.
Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look grim.
So does an exit exist? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.
Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his successor would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.
Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.
In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.
Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.
“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”